This article considers the consequences for a central bank of a declining stock of government debt. The model has a treasury that taxes, spends, and issues debt; a central bank that conducts open market operations in treasury debt; and banks that intermediate private savings. It suggests that a sufficiently small stock of debt can put an economy on the Pareto inferior side of the seigniorage Laffer curve, implying unnecessarily high inflation. If there is also a primary budget deficit, equilibrium might not exist. Discount-window lending is a potentially desirable alternative to open market operations, especially if the loans are not subsidized.
1. Banks figure prominently in the model. This seems appropriate for two reasons. First, many think that monetary policy works primarily by affecting bank behavior. Second, one purpose of this paper is to address how monetary policy might be conducted through the use of the discount window. Doing so clearly requires using an explicit model of the banking system that allows determination of how bank behavior is affected by changes in access to the discount window.
dures, some projections suggest that the Fed will hit its self-imposed limit on government bond holdings by 2003 [for example, projections by Goldman Sachs economists Dudley and Youngdahl (2000) ].
In light of these prospects, this paper addresses the following questions. What implications does the reduction in the stock of government debt outstanding have for the conduct of monetary policy? In particular, what implications does it have for the feasibility of attaining various inflation rates or nominal interest rates? Is there any rationale for a central bank limiting the fraction of outstanding government debt that it holds in its portfolio, as the Federal Reserve System currently does? Can monetary policy objectives that are currently accomplished through open market operations instead be accomplished through discount-window lending? If so, how should the discount rate be set relative to market interest rates?
The vehicle for addressing these questions is a model in which the treasury taxes, spends, and issues debt, and the central bank conducts monetary policy either through open market operations alone, or through a combination of open market operations and discount-window lending. As in Townsend (1980 Townsend ( , 1987 , spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for currency and, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , banks arise endogenously to insure agents against the effects of random shocks to their demand for liquid assets.
1 More specifically, agents are divided between two distinct locations, and the opportunities for communication between these locations are limited. In each period, agents consume and decide how to allocate their savings between money, government bonds, and physical capital (storage). All savings are intermediated through the banking system. After making their investment decisions, some agents will find themselves randomly relocated from one location to another. Agents who are not relocated remain in contact with their bank, and hence can avoid using currency to make transactions. In contrast, agents who are relocated lose contact with their bank, and thus require currency to make purchases. Moreover, since the event of being relocated requires agents to transact with cash instead of other, higher-yielding assets, agents will want to be insured against the risk of being relocated and, by implication, the risk of having to convert other assets into currency to conduct transactions. Banks provide this insurance by using some of the deposits they accept to acquire cash reserves that they can use to pay relocated agents. The rest of their funds they invest in the economy's two other primary assets-government bonds and physical storage. In equilibrium, banks' demand for cash reserves depends on the opportunity cost of holding reserves. If the nominal interest rate (and thus, in this model, the inflation rate) is low, banks will wish to hold relatively large stocks of real cash reserves.
This latter observation has a potentially strong implication for a central bank that must back the outstanding stock of base money with a shrinking stock of government 2. For 2000, total discount-window borrowing amounted to less than 0.2 percent of total Federal Reserve assets (Board of Governors 2001, p. 320). debt. If the stock of government debt outstanding is too small, the central bank will not be able to satisfy the demand for reserves that prevails when nominal interest rates are low. As a result, there will be a strict lower bound on the equilibrium nominal interest rate and inflation rate. Indeed, this lower bound will be such that the economy is forced to "the wrong side"-the Pareto inferior side-of the seigniorage Laffer curve, with the inflation rate and nominal interest rate both unnecessarily high. In addition, the model indicates the possibility of even more severe consequences for economies with primary government budget deficits: an equilibrium might fail to exist if the stock of government debt outstanding is too low.
As would be expected, the problems arising from a shrinking stock of government debt are exacerbated if the central bank limits the fraction of debt outstanding that it can hold. Such a limitation restricts further the amount of liquidity that the central bank can provide. It therefore requires corresponding increases in the amount of debt outstanding for an equilibrium on the Pareto superior side of the Laffer curve to be feasible. This model thus provides no rationale for a central bank to limit its holdings of government debt.
The model can be used to estimate how much debt must be outstanding to prevent the existence of binding lower limits on the nominal interest rate. Under current Federal Reserve operating procedures and current projections of the time path of the stock of government debt, the model indicates that by 2005 the stock of debt will be sufficiently small to force the economy to the Pareto inferior side of the Laffer curve.
Fortunately, any inability of the central bank to provide liquidity through open market operations alone can be rectified if the central bank is willing to use discountwindow lending as an instrument of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve, for example, conducted policy primarily by adjusting discount-window credit during its early years. The model shows that use of a discount window can exactly replicate the equilibria feasible through open market operations alone if the central bank sets the discount rate at the market interest rate. This assumes, of course, that banks are willing to use the discount window. In the United States, discount-window use has been extremely low since the mid-1980s, so something might have to be done to increase discount-window activity for the window to be an effective policy tool.
2 One possibility is to subsidize discount-window borrowing further, beyond the current subsidy of about 50 basis points. The model shows, however, that subsidized discount-window borrowing can increase steady-state welfare only if the economy is on the Pareto inferior side of the Laffer curve. If, instead, the economy is on the Pareto superior side of the curve-which is presumably the desired result of supplementing open market operations with discount-window lending-then a subsidized discount rate necessarily reduces steady-state welfare. These findings suggest that if monetary policy is to be conducted through the discount window, then there is a strong case for the loans to be made at market rates of interest.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the environ-ment. Sections 2 and 3 consider the implications for equilibrium of a shrinking stock of government debt, first, in the case where the treasury is active and the central bank passive in terms of which institution moves first in setting its policy variables (following Leeper 1991) and, second, in the case where the central bank is active. The alternative of conducting monetary policy through the extension of discount-window credit is the subject of section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE ENVIRONMENT
Private Agents
Consider an infinite-horizon economy, with t ϭ 1,2... indexing time. The economy consists of two identical islands, each inhabited by an infinite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping generations. At the start of each date, each generation has a continuum of ex ante identical young agents of measure one. In addition, at t ϭ 1 there is an initial old generation in each location.
There is a single consumption good available at each date. Agents are endowed with ω Ͼ 0 units of this good when young and before taxes are imposed. They are endowed with nothing when old. For simplicity, young agents derive no utility from consumption. With c denoting the quantity of the good consumed when old, an agent's lifetime utility is Agents have access to a common linear storage technology that allows them to transfer wealth across periods. One unit invested at date t yields x Ͼ 1 units of consumption at t ϩ 1.
At the beginning of each date, agents can communicate and trade only with other agents inhabiting the same location. This limited ability to communicate in conjunction with the spatial separation generates a transaction role for currency as follows. Transactions can involve any of the economy's three primary assets: storage (investment), government bonds, and currency. Thus, at the beginning of each date, young agents either directly or indirectly store goods and acquire government liabilities in the form of bonds or currency. Once these portfolio allocations occur, a fraction π of young agents in each location is selected at random to move to the other island. The value π is thus the probability of relocation and is common knowledge. However, which individuals will have to relocate is not known at the beginning of a period.
The primary assets have some features that make transacting difficult for young agents who must relocate. Specifically, stored goods cannot be transported between locations. This could be the case because the returns to storage have not been realized at the time relocation occurs and the investment process cannot be interrupted, or because the cost of transporting the goods is prohibitive. Likewise, government bonds either are nonnegotiable or, as is typically true in practice, they are issued only
in denominations too large to be used in individual transactions. In either case, the implication is that agents cannot transact with government bonds. As a result, agents who are relocated require currency to make purchases in their new location. Thus, as in Townsend (1980 Townsend ( , 1987 , spatial separation and limited communication create a role for money in transactions. The event of being relocated forces agents to liquidate claims to high-yield assets (bonds and investments) in exchange for low-yield currency. Relocation thus acts much as the liquidity-preference shock in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, and agents will wish to be insured against being relocated. Banks that accept deposits and hold the economy's primary assets directly can efficiently provide this insurance (Greenwood and Smith 1997) . Thus, agents will choose to do all their saving through such intermediaries.
At the beginning of each period, young agents will deposit their after-tax endowment with a bank. The bank then allocates its portfolio between currency, government bonds, and storage, and chooses the rates of return to pay agents as a function of whether those agents relocate. (Section 1.3 describes the bank's problem in greater detail.) After these decisions are made, the specific identities of the agents to be relocated are revealed. Relocated agents then contact their bank in a decentralized manner, exchanging their deposit claims for cash. The currency obtained is then carried to the new location, where it will be used to purchase consumption goods the following period. For agents who are not relocated-and thus who remain in contact with their bank-currency is not required to make purchases. These agents then become residual claimants on their bank's interest-earning assets. This timing of events is depicted in Figure 1 .
The Government
In addition to the agents just described, the economy has an active government sector. This sector can be thought of as having two separate entities: the treasury and the central bank.
At each date, the treasury has an exogenously given level of real expenditures per capita, g t , and levies a real lump-sum tax (transfer) on each young agent of τ t Ͼ (Ͻ) 0. Thus, its real primary budget deficit per capita is g t Ϫ τ t at date t. 
In addition, the central bank's holdings of government bonds are limited by the stock of government bonds outstanding:
As in the United States, the central bank rebates to the treasury all interest earned on its holdings of government bonds after covering its expenses (assumed to be zero), but retains the principal. If R t is the gross real rate of interest paid on government debt between t and t ϩ 1 and T t is the nominal value of the rebate at time t, then the real rebate is (2) Given the central bank's behavior, the treasury's budget constraint can be written as 
The last term in equation (4) reflects the fact that the central bank's holdings of government bonds effectively earn a zero nominal rate of interest and thus a gross real return of p tϪ1 /p t between t Ϫ 1 and t, whereas debt held by the public (the second term on the right) earns a positive nominal rate of interest.
Bank Behavior
As indicated above, at date t each young agent deposits the entire value of his after-tax endowment, ω Ϫ τ t , in a bank. Banks use these deposits to acquire currency (cash reserves), bonds, and storage. They behave competitively in asset markets, taking as given the gross real rate of return on reserves (p t /p tϪ1 ), on bonds (R t ), and on storage (x). In issuing liabilities, banks can be thought of as coalitions of ex ante identical young agents that choose to pay a gross real rate of return per unit deposited of d t m to agents who relocate between t and t ϩ 1 and a return of d t n to agents who remain settled.
A representative bank faces three constraints. It faces the balance-sheet constraints
where m t denotes the bank's holdings of real cash reserves per depositor at t, b t p denotes its bond holdings in real terms per depositor, and s t denotes its storage investments in real terms per depositor. Equation (5) constrains bank assets to not exceed bank liabilities, while equation (6) asserts that total payments to depositors cannot exceed a bank's earnings from its asset holdings. In addition, given current and future price levels, the bank's cash reserves must be sufficient to allow the bank to pay the return promised to young agents who relocate. This requires that (7) As a coalition of ex ante identical agents at t, a bank's problem is to maximize subject to (5) through (7). If private agents can sell government bonds short, then an absence of arbitrage opportunities requires
Throughout this paper, the focus is on situations where some goods storage occurs, so that (8) holds with equality at each date. In addition, if the gross nominal interest
3. See Paal and Smith (2000) and Smith (2001) for a discussion of closely related environments where positive nominal rates of interest are optimal. rate is defined by I t ϵ R t (p tϩ1 /p t ) ϭ x(p tϩ1 /p t ), then it is easy to verify that (7) holds with equality when I t Ͼ 1 since banks will not want to carry cash reserves between periods. In what follows, the focus is on equilibria with I t Ͼ 1 for all t.
3 When this condition is satisfied, the solution to the bank's maximization problem can be described as follows.
A representative bank's reserve-deposit ratio is denoted γ t , where γ t ϵ m t /(ω Ϫ τ t ). It is easy to verify that the bank's optimal reserve-deposit ratio is given by the following expression:
The following lemma summarizes some important properties of the function γ(I).
LEMMA 1. The function γ(I) has the following properties:
In particular, γ′(I) Ͻ 0 since ρ ∈ (0,1). That is, higher nominal interest rates imply a higher opportunity cost of holding reserves and thus a lower reserve-deposit ratio for the bank.
Given the bank's optimal reserve-deposit ratio, equations (6) and (7) imply that and It follows that
. Thus, the higher the nominal rate of interest, the less insurance banks provide against the event of relocation. Intuitively, this is because relocated agents require cash, and the higher the nominal interest rate, the higher is the opportunity cost of holding cash reserves to finance the consumption of those who are relocated.
Finally, the maximized expected utility of a representative depositor at t, V(I t ), is
4. This same issue arises in the "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" literature. See Sargent and Wallace (1981). and V′(I t ) Ͻ 0. Welfare is decreasing in the nominal interest rate because of the less complete provision of insurance at higher interest rates.
The remainder of this paper characterizes the equilibria of this economy. To accomplish this, it is necessary to take a stand on how monetary and fiscal policy are conducted. In essence, the issue is whether the treasury or the central bank acts first. 4 Following Leeper (1991) , the government entity taken to act first is said to behave actively, while the one that reacts is said to behave passively. The next two sections consider alternative scenarios that differ in terms of which entity acts first in setting policy.
EQUILIBRIA WITH AN ACTIVE TREASURY AND PASSIVE CENTRAL BANK
This section considers a scenario in which the treasury exogenously sets the time path for the real value of government debt outstanding. This scenario seems most consistent with recent policy discussions, at least in the United States, about the constraints imposed on a central bank by a shrinking stock of government debt. In particular, within the Federal Reserve System, these discussions have tended to presume that the Treasury will determine the evolution of the stock of government debt outstanding, and the Fed must adjust its behavior accordingly.
Clearly the bond market clears if b t p ϩ b t c ϵ b t ϭ B t /p t . Thus, to capture the desired scenario, it is assumed that τ t ϭ τ and g t ϭ g for all t, with τ given exogenously, and that the treasury sets a target time path for the stock of government debt of (10) b 0 Ն 0 given. In (10), b -Ͼ 0 is the real value of outstanding government debt in a steady state and µ ∈ (0,1). Given these assumptions about the time path of the stock of government debt, a competitive equilibrium can be characterized. In equilibrium, government bonds held by the public must compete with storage in private portfolios. Hence the gross real rate of return on government debt, R t , must equal x. As a result, the treasury's budget constraint (4) can be written as
Equation (11), combined with the central bank's balance-sheet constraint, (1), yields the standard consolidated balance sheet for the treasury and the central bank:
This can be rewritten using the definitions p tϪ1 /p t ϵ x/I tϪ1 and b t ϵ b t p ϩ b t c as (12) Similarly, the money market clears if ,
since all beginning-of-period demand for real balances derives from the reserve demand of banks. Together, equations (12) and (13) 
Equation (15) states that interest payments on the stock of debt outstanding must be financed by a combination of primary budget surpluses (τ Ϫ g) and seigniorage revenue (x(ωϪτ)γ(I)[(IϪ1)/I]). Defining the function H(I) ϵ γ(I)(IϪ1)/I, which is approximately seigniorage per unit of deposits, allows seigniorage revenue to be written as (x(ωϪτ)H(I)) and (15) to be written as
Clearly, ψ(I) is proportional to the sum of seigniorage revenue and the primary budget surplus. The properties of H(I) are stated in the following lemma, which is proven in the appendix. The lemma implies that the relationship between the nominal interest rate and seigniorage revenue follows a standard inflation-tax Laffer curve.
LEMMA 2. The function H(I) has the following properties:
It follows that equilibrium condition (16) can be depicted as in Figure 2 for the case τ Ϫ g Ͻ 0. From (16) and Figure 2 , the next result is apparent. 
PROPOSITION 1. The potential for steady-state equilibria to exist is as follows: (a) Suppose that
Condition (19) 
, so if the treasury had to pay the market interest rate on all outstanding debt-including that held by the central bankthen it would run a deficit. Equation (19) is consistent with the existence of a primary government budget surplus (g Ͻ τ), or with a surplus when debt held by the central bank effectively does not earn interest (that is, when the central bank rebates interest earnings on its bond holdings to the treasury). In what follows, (18) is assumed to hold so that it is potentially feasible for the treasury to finance its primary budget deficit and the interest payments on its outstanding government debt of b -. However, as will be shown below, some projections for government budget surpluses and debt levels violate (19), making them inconsistent with the existence of a steady-state equilibrium. Intuitively, the factors that determine candidate steady-state nominal rates of interest are the same factors at play in conventional analyses of seigniorage Laffer curves (Sargent 1987, ch. 7; Azariadis 1993, ch. 19 ). The value x/I is the gross real rate of return on real balances in a steady state. If the government budget deficit (inclusive of interest payments on the government debt if all debt earns the market real return) is not too large, there is more than one value of the rate of return on real balances potentially consistent with a steady-state equilibrium. The assumption that (18) holds implies the existence of exactly two such values, x/I and x/I -. The steady state with I t ϭ I (I -) thus has a relatively low (high) associated rate of inflation. And
, so values of I t Ͻ (Ͼ)Iˆare on the good (bad) side of the Laffer curve. In other words, the candidate equilibrium with I t ϭ I is Pareto superior to the equilibrium with I t ϭ I -. 
Steady States Permitted by Limits on the
Condition (20) Figure 3 (that is, it must be in the shaded area in the figure) . Second, there are three possible outcomes regarding the existence of steady states. Case 1: (ωϪτ)γ(I) Յ b -. In this case, both candidate steady states satisfy (20). Essentially, there is enough government debt outstanding for the central bank to supply the liquidity required even at the steady state with the low nominal interest rate (low inflation rate). This is the case illustrated in Figure 3 .
Here the quantity of government debt outstanding is too low to allow the central bank to meet private demands for liquidity at the steady state with the low nominal interest rate (low inflation rate). As a result, there is a unique steady-state equilibrium at the high nominal interest rate, I -.
When this case arises, the stock of government debt outstanding is so low that the central bank cannot supply the liquidity demanded even at the candidate steady state with the high nominal interest rate (high inflation rate). Consequently, there is no steady-state equilibrium. Clearly cases 2 and 3 are problematic in the following sense. In case 2 the nominal interest rate and inflation rate are higher than they would need to be if only the treasury issued more debt. Also, steady-state welfare is lower than it needs to be. 
These conditions are satisfied for b - Figure 4 . Similarly, case 2 obtains if . Figure 4 illustrates that values of
-1 ) satisfy these conditions. Finally, the economy is Figure 4 , b -1 and b -2 are the stocks of outstanding debt that satisfy conditions (16) and (20) simultaneously and with equality. Clearly, they depend on the size of the government's budget surplus. Specifically, as the government surplus becomes larger, the Laffer curve shifts up, altering the intersection of conditions (16) and (20) 
Budget Surpluses and the Existence of Steady States. As is apparent from
x g x H b ϭ Ϫ Ϫ ϩ Ϫ Ϫ Ϫ 1 1 1 τ ω τ γ ω τ ( ) .           b x g x H b Ͼ Ϫ Ϫ ϩ Ϫ Ϫ Ϫ 1 1 1 τ ω τ γ ω τ ( )           b x g x H b ϭ Ϫ Ϫ ϩ Ϫ Ϫ Ϫ 1 1 1 τ ω τ γ ω τ ( )           (ii) If (ωϪτ)γ(1) Ͼ [τϪgϩx(ωϪτ)H(1)] but (ωϪτ)γ(Iˆ) Ͻ [τϪgϩx(ωϪτ)H(Iˆ)],-Ն b - 1 , case 2 if b - 1 Ͻ b -Յ b - 2 ,
and case 3 otherwise. If instead (ωϪτ)γ(I˜) Ͼ [τϪgϩx(ωϪτ)H(I˜)], then (24) has no solution.
Equation (20) is violated and the economy is in case 3 for all b -.
The proof of Proposition 2 appears in the appendix. Part (a) of the proposition has an interesting implication: if there is a primary government budget surplus, then existence of a steady-state equilibrium is guaranteed because case 3 never obtains. With a primary government budget surplus, the central bank can always provide enough liquidity to support at least the equilibrium with a high interest rate (high inflation rate). Part (b) of the proposition states the obverse: if the primary government budget deficit is too large, a central bank might be unable to provide enough liquidity to support any equilibrium. This can occur even if b -∈[(τϪg)/(xϪ1), 
The Effects of a Reduction in the Steady-State Stock of Treasury Debt.
The consequences of a decision by the treasury to reduce the real value of its outstanding debt depend on which of the cases discussed above obtains. If the stock of debt outstanding is sufficiently large to put the economy in case 1 initially (that is, b - Figure 4) , then one possibility is that the economy remains in case 1 after the reduction in the debt. Two steady states exist both before and after the reduction in the stock of debt. The nominal rate of interest and the inflation rate fall (rise) on the good (bad) side of the Laffer curve as debt is reduced. Since the nominal interest rate falls on the good side of the Laffer curve, real balances rise, as does the money-bond ratio m/b -ϭ γ(I)(ωϪτ)/b -. The corresponding reduction in inflation on the good side of the Laffer curve thus reflects conventional unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic arguments (Sargent and Wallace 1981; Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith 1998) . A second possibility is that the stock of debt is reduced enough to push the economy from case 1 to case 2 (that is, b - Figure 4 ). The new steady-state equilibrium necessarily has a higher nominal interest rate and inflation rate as a result. And if the economy was initially on the Pareto superior side of the Laffer curve, the resulting increase in inflation and the nominal interest rate could be quite large. Likewise, if the economy is in case 2 before and after the reduction in the debt, then the decline in b -must result in a higher steady-state nominal interest rate and inflation rate. It is straightforward to show that the reduction in debt is associated with a reduction in the ratio of money to bonds. Since the rate of inflation rises, a result analogous to the unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic result obtains. This is the case despite the economy's being on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. Finally, if the stock of debt falls sufficiently far, say below b -2 in Figure 4 , so that the economy is pushed into case 3, then an equilibrium ceases to exist. Of course this can only occur if case 3 can exist, which requires that there be a primary government budget deficit.
Dynamics
This section considers the kinds of equilibrium paths that can be observed outside of steady states. Combining equations (14) and (10) holds for all t Ն 1.
. This is quite different from the standard situation that arises in conventional pure-exchange, overlapping-generations models with an exogenously given government budget deficit (for example, Sargent 1987 , ch. 7, or Azariadis 1993 .
7. Smith (1991 Smith ( , 1994 and Woodford (1994) also explore the tensions between efficiency and determinacy of equilibrium.
Since (25) involves only terms dated t Ϫ 1, the only intrinsic dynamics governing the evolution of the nominal interest rate are embodied in the dynamics governing the evolution of the debt [equation (10)]. Alternatively, the determination of the nominal interest rate at t Ϫ 1 is independent of the determination of the nominal rate at any other date. 6 This fact gives rise to several possibilities regarding the types of dynamical equilibria that can be observed. Some examples follow.
Example 1: Suppose that b -Ն b -1 . Then if b 0 is not too large, (25) will have two solutions, both satisfying (26). In other words, case 1 will obtain at all dates. Letting I(b tϪ1 ) (I -(b tϪ1 )) denote the smallest (largest) solution to (25), it follows that the only restriction on equilibrium sequences {I t } is that . 7 In particular, the attainment of a steady state with a low nominal interest rate (low inflation rate) requires that b -be large enough so that the economy is in case 1. But, if it is, there will be a large set of equilibrium paths, as just shown. Example 2: Suppose that g Ͼ τ and that b -
Then with respect to steady states, the economy is in case 2. For t sufficiently large, (25) has only one solution that satisfies (26). Or, in other words, for t sufficiently large, there is a unique equilibrium nominal rate of interest. Of course, if b 0 is large enough, there may be a finite number of periods where the nominal interest rate can take on either of two values.
Stronger Restrictions on Central Bank Holdings of Government Debt
In practice, the central bank may face stronger restrictions than just b t c Յ b t . For example, current rules governing the Federal Reserve's System Open Market Account put limits on the fraction of outstanding debt that can be held of various maturities. These limits range from 35 percent of the outstanding bills and coupons with a maturity of less than one year to 15 percent for issues with maturities of ten years or more (Dudley and Youngdahl 2000, p. 4) .
Such restrictions imply that the central bank's debt holdings must satisfy the stronger constraint b t c Յ θb t , given some exogenously set value θ ∈(0,1). With this restriction, the analysis of steady states requires that (20) be replaced with
The findings above still apply, except that case 1 obtains if and only if γ
Similarly, case 2 obtains if ,
and so on. Figure 6 shows how a reduction in θ shifts (27) up, raising b -1 and reducing the range of debt levels consistent with the existence of case 1. It considers high and low values of θ (the low one corresponding to a more binding limitation), and assumes that the stock of debt outstanding is b -1 (θ H ), so that the economy is in case 1 with the less binding restriction, θ H . When θ is reduced to θ L , the smallest stock of debt consistent with the existence of case 1 rises to b -1 (θ L ). The economy is driven to case 2 and thus a Pareto inferior equilibrium. Moreover, if τ Ͻ g, even tighter restrictions than those shown could push the economy into case 3. Thus, restrictions on the amount of treasury debt that can be held by the central bank can reduce welfare by 9. In the model, all reserves are excess reserves.
moving the economy from case 1 to case 2, or can pose problems for the existence of equilibrium by moving the economy to case 3. The model suggests, therefore, that there is no economic justification for such restrictions, and there is substantial justification for removing them if they are in place.
How Much Debt Does the Central Bank Need?
It is possible to attach empirically plausible parameter values to the model. The term b -1 can be calculated to obtain an estimate of how much debt must be issued, given the primary budget surplus, to ensure that case 1 obtains.
According to the 2001 Economic Report of the President (Table B- 8 This broad monetary aggregate corresponds well to deposits in the model since the model assumes that all holding of government liabilities (except debt held by the central bank) and all investment is done by intermediaries. Total federal debt held by the public (Table B- (Table  B- 73) was about 6 percent in 2000. In addition, conventional estimates give an annual real rate of return of 1.04 (Prescott 1986) .
In calibrating the model, the question arises of how to interpret the length of a period. For simplicity, the analysis assumes that all government debt is repaid one period after issue. Therefore, the length of a period is taken to be the average maturity of the federal debt, which is about six years (Economic Report of the President, Table B-88). Compounded over the six years until the average treasury security matures, the rates of return reported above imply that reasonable values for I and x are 1.42 and 1.27, respectively.
Ideally, parameter choices would approximately match two additional observations. First, Iγ′(I)/γ(I) ϭ Ϫ((1Ϫρ)/ρ)(1Ϫγ(I)), the long-run interest elasticity of excess reserves, should be consistent with empirical estimates of this elasticity.
9 According to Goldfeld (1966, p. 149) , this elasticity is about Ϫ0.3. Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System report that this estimate of the long-run elasticity is still reasonable today. In the model, an elasticity of Ϫ0.3 is obtained by setting ρ ϭ 0.75. This elasticity exhibits little sensitivity to any reasonable choice of π. Second, the observed debt level, budget surplus, and nominal interest rate should be consistent with the existence of an equilibrium when sustained as steady-state values [that is, should satisfy (16)]. Whether the model matches this observation depends primarily on the value used for π. For a debt level of $3,410 billion, a surplus of $236.2 billion, deposits of $17,810 billion, I ϭ 1.42, and x ϭ 1.27, equation (16) NOTES: a Equation (16) is always above equation (20) for π ϭ 0.034 and surpluses of $500 billion and $236.2 billion. Thus, the debt levels given are the minimum level required for equation (16) (with deposits taken to be L). That ratio is 0.03. Clearly, this value is small relative to 0.1. To have γ(1.42) ϭ 0.03, it is necessary to set π ϭ 0.034. Interestingly, when π ϭ 0.034, equation (16) is everywhere above equation (20) given the government surplus from the data. However, it is also true, given current debt levels, surpluses, and rates of return, that equation (16) has no solution when π ϭ 0.034. That is, if π ϭ 0.034, then the model implies that current debt service is too large to be financed. Therefore, since intuition provides little guidance in picking π, a value of π ϭ 0.034 (π ϭ 0.111) is taken to be a lower (upper) bound on π, and the value of b -1 corresponding to both values of π is calculated. Table 1 reports estimates of b -1 for the parameter values just described, as well as for different scenarios regarding government budget surpluses. Varying the size of the surplus has little impact on the minimum amount of debt required for case 1 to obtain.
Of course, these calculations presume that the Federal Reserve System can hold the entire government debt. As noted above, current operating procedures allow it to hold less than 35 percent of the debt (Dudley and Youngdahl 2000, p. 4) . To capture this, Table 1 Table 1 therefore suggest that if π ϭ 0.111, the the economy will be in case 2 by 2005, even in the absence of restrictions on the amount of debt the Federal Reserve System holds. However, if π ϭ 0.034, there is no immediate danger of leaving case 1. Since these values of π bracket the range of reasonable choices, the possibility of transiting into case 2 by 2005 should, at a minimum, be taken seriously. Moreover, given current self-imposed restrictions on the Fed's holdings of government bonds, even with π ϭ 0.034, Table 1 indicates that the economy will be in case 2 within the next decade if the primary government budget remains in surplus. Setting π ϭ 0.111 implies that the economy is already in case 2, a possibility that seems reasonable to discount. Reality, then, should lie somewhere between the estimates obtained with π ϭ 0.034 and π ϭ 0.111. Table 1 therefore strongly suggests that case 2 will soon obtain unless limitations on Federal Reserve bond holdings are relaxed. In addition, case 2 might soon obtain even if these limits are eliminated. For example, Goldman Sachs (Dudley and Youngdahl 2000) estimates that case 2 will obtain by 2003 under current operating procedures.
EQUILIBRIA WITH A PASSIVE TREASURY AND ACTIVE CENTRAL BANK
This section describes how the analysis of section 2 would differ under the assumption that the central bank acts first. In what follows, it is assumed that the central bank sets a sequence of values for {I t } and that the level of outstanding treasury debt is endogenous. For simplicity, tax collections τ t remain constant at τ and exogenously given.
If the central bank follows the simple policy of setting I t ϭ I * for all t, then equation (12) reduces to
In addition, b t c Յ b t in equilibrium requires that
Equation ( Matters are only slightly different if the central bank follows some feedback rule for selecting the target value of the nominal interest rate at t. If, for example, the feedback rule takes the form I t ϭ f(I tϪ1 ), given I 0 Ͼ 1, if there is a unique value I * Ͼ 1 satisfying I * ϭ f(I * ), and if ͉f′(I * )͉ Ͻ 1, then the steady state is exactly as described. Moreover, it is a saddle, so that there is no potential for indeterminacies. Of course, the exact nature of equilibrium dynamics depends on the properties of the feedback rule f. Matters could be more complicated if the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in a way that depends on the history of the outstanding stock of debt.
AN ALTERNATIVE: CONDUCTING MONETARY POLICY THROUGH THE DISCOUNT WINDOW
While monetary policy in the United States today is conducted almost entirely through open market operations, this is far from the only means by which it can be conducted. Early in its history, the Federal Reserve System added and withdrew money from the economy primarily by expanding and contracting discount-window lending. And in view of the fact that the Federal Reserve may soon hold as much government debt as the combination of its rules and the outstanding stock of debt allows, many are advocating that the Fed return to conducting monetary policy through the discount window (Minutes of the FOMC 2001). This section discusses how this approach might work. It begins with a description of a central bank that conducts policy either via open market operations or through discount-window lending. It proceeds to consider how access to discount-window loans affects the behavior of banks. The section concludes with an analysis of equilibrium when a discount window operates.
Central Bank Operations with a Discount Window
As before, the central bank is assumed to hold treasury debt with a real per capita value of b t c at t and to rebate any interest income to the treasury. In addition, it is assumed that the central bank makes discount-window loans with a real value of ᐉ t c per
10. This aspect of the model derives from the fact that each bank's withdrawal demand is perfectly predictable. It would be interesting to consider how matters might change if banks confronted stochastic withdrawal demands.
11. There has been some discussion in policy circles recently, given the relative inactivity of the discount window for the last twenty years, of the possible need for subsidies to induce banks to use the window more intensively if discount-window lending is to be a means of conducting monetary policy. capita at t and charges a gross nominal interest rate (that is, the discount rate) of I t c between t and t ϩ 1 on those loans. Banks will borrow at the discount window only if I t c Յ I t . 10 In what follows, the possibility that the discount rate is below the market rate is allowed. Thus, the discount rate serves as an additional instrument of monetary policy.
11
In this environment, the central bank's balance sheet requires that (33) In addition, since the central bank rebates all of its nominal interest earnings to the treasury, the real value of its rebates at t is given by It follows that the treasury's budget constraint at date t is 
Bank Behavior in the Presence of a Discount Window
Bank behavior is exactly as described in section 1, except that now banks have access to a discount window. It is assumed that the central bank imposes a limit on discount-window borrowing of Intuitively, if other things remain equal, depositors would benefit from slightly subsidized discount-window lending (choices of η close to, but less than, one). However, this benefit is more than offset by the higher nominal interest rate and the higher rate of inflation required to finance the subsidy. Thus, the policy of charging below-market interest rates at the discount window is beneficial only in equilibria on the wrong side of the Laffer curve.
CONCLUSION
For a central bank that conducts monetary policy through open market purchases and sales of government bonds, low levels of government debt outstanding can have major implications. As this paper has shown, if the value of the debt is too low, a lower bound is placed on the nominal rate of interest and thus the rate of inflation that can constitute equilibria. And these lower bounds are large in the sense that they require nominal interest and inflation rates to lie on the Pareto inferior side of the seigniorage Laffer curve. Calculations using U.S. data suggest that debt levels in the United States could soon be low enough for these lower bounds to become binding, at least given current Federal Reserve operating procedures. If the government were to run a primary budget deficit, it could even be the case that excessively low levels of debt would interfere with the existence of an equilibrium.
Intuitively, low debt levels are problematic for the following reason. Low nominal rates of interest lead agents to demand high levels of liquidity. When debt levels are too low, central bank operating procedures prevent the supply of liquidity from being adequate to satisfy demand. As a result, low nominal rates of interest cannot be observed in equilibrium.
Matters become even worse when there are exogenously imposed limits on the amount of government debt that the central bank can hold. Currently, the Federal Reserve System has self-imposed limits on the fraction of the debt of various maturities that it can hold. These kinds of restrictions raise the debt level required to prevent lower bounds on nominal interest rates from becoming binding.
Central banks can avoid the implications of low debt levels by conducting mone-tary policy through a discount window. In theory, if the central bank charges market rates of interest on discount window loans, it can completely undo any limitations on its ability to provide liquidity that might be implied by low levels of government debt. In practice, however, at least in the United States today, discount-window borrowing is extremely low and would have to be stimulated for the discount window to be a viable means of conducting policy. The analysis here suggests that subsidizing discount-window loans will reduce steady-state welfare, at least in equilibria on the good side of the Laffer curve. A case for subsidizing discount-window lending would rely on arguing that the economy is likely to end up in equilibria on the wrong side of the Laffer curve.
Of course, the model presented in this paper abstracts from a number of factors that are likely to be relevant to the issues discussed. At a very basic level, it abstracts from real economic growth, which would tend to raise the demand for liquidity over time. Thus, allowing for growth would simply imply that the U.S. economy is likely to reach case 2 even sooner than suggested here.
The model also abstracts from other factors that are likely to affect the demand for liquidity, and hence b -1 . One is developments abroad, such as dollarization, that increase the demand for U.S. base money. Another factor is reduction in the use of cash in transactions, which also reduces the demand for base money (as, for example, in Schreft and Smith 2000) . Any tendency for the demand for base money to rise or fall over time would affect the estimate of b -1 . The analysis of limits on how much debt the central bank can hold also ignores two important points. First, it assumes that debt markets remain competitive no matter how much of the debt is held by the central bank. Clearly, the case for imposing limits on a central bank's holdings of debt has greater support if government debt markets are thinner when the private sector holds a small fraction of the debt outstanding. Second, the model assumes that a second risk-free asset is available for agents to hold in addition to government bonds and that no risky assets are available. Thus, the model cannot assess the possible loss to the private sector if government debt disappears and so can no longer serve as a benchmark in pricing risky assets.
Finally, the analysis of the discount window abstracts from a number of issues as well. For example, it does not consider risk or collateral requirements associated with discount-window lending. A shortage of eligible collateral, for instance, could prevent the use of discount-window lending from completely undoing the consequences of low debt levels. The analysis also abstracts from the possibility that large volumes of discount-window lending would create moral hazard problems in banking. Clearly, these are considerations that could prevent discount-window lending from being a perfect substitute for open-market operations. 
